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CHAPTER I1 
"A PUBLIC SERVANT, NOT A PRIVATE EMPLOYEE" 
Inadequate salaries, poor working conditions, and a working class back- 
ground frequently fostered a sense of fraternity between policemen and 
laborers. This comradeship, promoted by common dissatisfactions, oc- 
casionally surfaced as sympathy shown to striking laborers either by tacit ap- 
proval or by active support from police officers during the years of labor 
unrest from the 1870s to the 1920s. To be sure, sympathy for laborers was 
not universal among police officers, but it was observed often enough to 
cast doubt on their reliability during strikes, particularly when strike 
breakers were used by companies. As Herbert G. Gutman has noted, in the 
clash between striking miners and Illinois coal companies during the 1870s, 
"Local judges and police officials enforced the law more rigorously against 
them [the mine companies] and their men than against the resident 
miners." Rejecting demands by the mine operators to have Pinkerton 
agents appointed as "special deputies," the mayor and sheriff instead depu- 
tized the strikers.1 Similar incidents of collaboration between the police and 
strikers were repeated elsewhere. During the Chicago streetcar strike of 
1885 a contemporary noted that the police "could not but sympathize with 
the strike, like everyone else, and this made them too lenient with the 
sympathizers." In June 1900 St. Louis police officers in sympathy with the 
city's streetcar strikers refused to make arrests. They were joined by seven 
deputy sheriffs, who were arrested for refusing to protect the Transit Com- 
pany's property. A posse cornitatus was organized and special policemen 
used to restore and maintain order. At Cripple Creek, Colorado, in 1904, 
mining company sympathizers and townspeople threatened to lynch union 
miners and peace officers, including a justice of the peace. In October 191 1 
New Orleans policemen, sharing the animosity of strikers against imported 
strike breakers hired by the Southern Pacific Railroad, allowed strikers to 
beat the unwelcome visitors as they were entering the company's yards, 
and arrested those who were armed. Sympathy for the strikers was voiced 
by both the mayor and governor, who denounced the presence of the out- 
siders.2 During the Galveston longshoremen's strike of 1920, Governor 
W.P. Hobby instituted martial law and dismissed the entire police depart- 
ment when it failed to disperse the strikers or protect the strike breakers, 
who were being imported in large numbers by the companies. Policing 
duties were assigned to the militia until the strike was settied.3 
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The Electric Street Railway strikes of 1898 and 1904 best showed the 
affinity between police officers and union strikers in Houston. A strike 
began on March 20, 1898. It involved demands by motormen and conduc- 
tors for higher salaries. Strikers halted all streetcar service in Houston and 
the suburbs. Although strikers and their sympathizers made no effort to in- 
terfere with police-escorted drays delivering supplies to the non-striking 
workers living on company property, cars were prevented from leaving the 
yards. One car, with the company's secretary, Harry Chase, on board, was 
attacked and Chase was clubbed. The police made no effort to disperse the 
crowd of nearly 3,000, with the explanation by Chief of Police Charles 
Heim that the demonstrators were orderly. A personal request by general 
manager H.F. MacGregor for police assistance resulted in a brief conference 
with Heim in the company yard. MacGregor requested that ten officers be 
placed on two cars, but the chief, expressing the mood of his men, replied 
that such protection had not been shown to be necessary and in any case he 
would not take such an action unless ordered ro do so by the mayor. 
Leaving the conference, Heim shouted, to the delight of the strikers wait- 
ing outside, "Well, Boys, they won't be running today." Reflecting the 
feeling of the police in general, a patrolman told the crowd that "they could 
have his badge before he'd ride one of the cars."4 
A similar reluctance to interfere with the strikers was exhibited by the 
sheriffs department, which was sharply criticized by MacGregor for its 
failure to provide protection for the operation of the streetcars to Houston 
Heights. Sheriff Albert Erickson defended his lack of cooperation by point- 
ing out that although non-strikers had been physically threatened, no actual 
violence had occurred, and he could find no reason to provide the company 
with protective services. Erickson concluded that he had "no right even if 
[he] were inclined, to furnish . . . deputy sheriffs" for the protection of the 
company's property and advised MacGregor that protection would be pro- 
vided only when the department learned when and where trouble was ex- 
pected on the track.5 
In an effort to evade a confrontation with the strikers, a number of of- 
ficers failed to report for work as the second week of the strike began, pro- 
voking Heim to warn that any officer who missed roll call would be dis- 
missed from the force.6 Police officers found encouragement from the 
dispute that arose among the aldermen over the course of action required 
by the city council in dealing with the streetcar strikers. Alderman G.C. 
Street, supporting the requests for police protection by MacGregor, de- 
manded that if necessary the whole police force should be placed at the 
disposal of the Electric Company. Mayor H.B. Rice contended that Heim 
had offered all the police protection MacGregor required, while alderman 
T.W. Archer accused the company of "grinding down the working man," 
pointing out that $1.25 a day was not a living wage.' 
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In a conference with Heim at police headquarters, Rice concluded that 
the police department could not be relied upon to maintain order in a 
potentially explosive situation as tension in the city mounted. Following the 
meeting with Heim, Rice issued a call for fifty of Houston's responsible citi- 
zens to form a posse cornitatus. Only eighteen of the selected citizens re- 
sponded to the call, however, and the responsibility of maintaining order 
fell to the Houston Light Guard, a volunteer city militia that patrolled the 
streets and prevented clashes between company personnel and the strikers.8 
On March 31 the strike was settled with a compromise favoring the Electric 
Company, which allowed the company to retain forty-eight of the non- 
union employees and provided that the striking workers would be rehired, 
with those with the Iongest term of service hired first and the remaining 
men placed on a waiting list. The pay ranged from thirteen to seventeen 
cents per hour.9 
The settlement served only as a truce, but the 1898 strike had been a 
valuable lesson for the Houston company, for the confrontation dearly 
revealed the unreliability of police protection as well as the reluctance of the 
city council to take a firm position against the strikers. A future strike would 
require the company to rely on its own resources by importing professional 
strikebreakers and private guards, a tactic that had been employed else- 
where and had generally been accompanied by violence-as in the St. Louis 
streetcar strike of 1900. 
The second strike against the Houston Electric Railway Company 
began on June 1, 1904, over a dispute regarding alleged violations of a 
union contract settled the previous year. Unlike the 1898 strike, the situa- 
tion in 1904 involved a more serious confrontation, with both sides refus- 
ing to compromise their positions. Violence erupted on June 2 as striking 
workers and their supporters converged on the streetcar yards. A car was 
sent out by the company to test the temper of the crowd and the extent of 
police protection. The car was greeted by a barrage of stones from the wait- 
ing crowd, which struck several non-striking men riding in the car. Police 
efforts to disperse the crowd were ineffectual. Chief of Police George Ellis 
showed reluctance to investigate the disturbance, appearing on the scene 
only after receiving several telephone calls from company manager H.K. 
Payne for additional police protection. After surveying the situation, Ellis 
concluded that he could find no one seriously injured nor any need for fur- 
ther action by the police department. Shortly after his departure, fights en- 
sued, which resulted in the arrest of several non-strikers.10 
The situation became increasingly volatile with coercive efforts by the 
company to break the strike. "Professional" strikebreakers, many 
described as "typical Bowery toughs," who had been assembled in Austin, 
San Antonio, and St. Louis by the company in expectation of a strike, were 
rushed to Houston, where they were housed in company sheds. Armed 
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with clubs, the men guarded the cars, antagonizing the strikers. Strike- 
breakers and strikers clashed as the tatter attempted to prevent the move- 
ment of streetcars. Strikers received no interference from either the muni- 
cipal police or the sheriffs department, which was responsible for protecting 
those outlying areas of the city where the company operated commuter 
service. The police response was to arrest strikebreakers." 
Fearing that continued violence would cause adverse reaction to the 
cause of organized labor, the Houston Labor Council approved a resolution 
calling upon Mayor Andrew L. Jackson to appoint special police officers to 
ride in the streetcars. Mayor Jackson quickly responded and appointed a 
number of special officers in addition to calling out the Houston Light 
Guard to patrol the city streets. Special policemen, chosen from among 
local citizens, replaced company guards as strikebreakers. Unlike regular 
police officers, who confined their arrests to disorderly strikebreakers, the 
special police pursued a neutral course, arresting anyone interfering with 
the operation of the cars. The use of special policemen averted further 
clashes between non-strikers and strikers, but as the strike entered the 
second month several dynamite attacks were made on the cars as they 
operated on their regular routes. Although the city and company offered 
rewards for the dynamiters, no arrests were made, and the attacks ceased 
only with the settlement of the strike in August 1904.12 
The reluctance of the police and sheriffs departments to maintain or- 
der or to interfere with the strikers aroused sharp criticism from the press 
and the Houston Electric Railway Company. An editorial in the Chronicle 
and Herald warned that if "the constabulary force of the city and county do 
not stop it [the violence] the people will find officers who will do it." 
Following the dynamiting of three cars on July 5 ,  the newspaper concluded 
that "Some members of [the] force [are] evidently Iacking in moral courage 
. . . or are at heart anarchistic sympathizers. Unless they show more energy 
their badges will doubtless be removed." Similar charges were directed 
against the sheriffs department. Company manager Payne charged in pub- 
lished statements that Chief Ellis ignored his requests for protection and 
that the company was left to the mercy of the strikers. In response to 
Payne's remarks, Ellis replied "that . . . Payne . . . had an exaggerated idea 
of conditions, that the police force had given all protection needed, and that 
there had been no interference with streetcar employes worth men- 
tioning," and added "that it was not his business to anticipate trouble but 
to quell a disturbance when it took place." In closing he suggested that 
Payne request Sheriff Archie Anderson's assistance if he thought additional 
protection was necessary. Since the sheriff had left the city to attend a bar- 
becue in a neighboring town, Ellis's suggestion mereIy exacerbated the 
situation. 13 
A grand jury investigation into the conduct of the local law enforce- 
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ment agencies substantiated Payne's accusation. At the request of Judge 
J.K.P. Gillespie, the jury was instructed to return indictments against any 
peace officer who had proven derelict in performing his duties. Although no 
individual indictments were returned, the grand jury issued a scathing de- 
nunciation of the police department. "There has been an utter indifference 
shown on the part of the regular police officers," the jury charged. "The 
sheriff and deputies, constables, and regular officers of the police depart- 
ment, as far as known to the grand jury, did not make a single arrest of 
those engaged in rioting, rocking cars, or obstructing tracks by their own 
initiative." Only the militia and the special police officers appointed by the 
mayor received praise. The Houston Labor Council's backing of the ap- 
pointment of special officers was rewarded by the jury's commendation of 
its support for law and order.14 
The strikes of 1898 and 1904 revealed the sympathy of the police for 
the action taken by working men. It was an understanding based on the 
common experience of harsh working conditions and inadequate salaries 
shared by laborers and city employees. Only a year before the 1904 strike, 
Houston policemen had petitioned an unreceptive city council for higher 
salaries.15 Conditions did not improve for Houston policemen during the 
fifteen years following the 1904 strike. In 1917 the salary range for patrol- 
men remained at $65  to $80 per month, only $5 more than the $75 paid in 
1903.16 No job security or benefits compensated for the inadequate salaries. 
These conditions were accepted without complaint until 1920. By 1920, 
however, the years of dissatisfaction, fostered in part by labor unrest else- 
where, erupted into the first serious confrontation between police officers 
and the administration of Mayor A.E. Amerman. Following the Boston 
police strike of 1919, the general strike in Seattle during the previous year, 
and the widespread Iabor unrest throughout the nation, the Houston con- 
frontation took on more ominous implications than were justified by the 
realities of the local situation. A strike by the police department was not 
contemplated or even suggested. Police officers, together with dissident 
firemen, did no more than appeal to the public for support in a request for 
higher salaries. 
The first indication of a coming confrontation surfaced in 1917. Peti- 
tions signed by hundreds of citizens and sponsored by three attorneys 
representing the police officers were filed with the city council. The peti- 
tions requested that police salaries be increased "to such an amount that 
they can support and maintain their families and educate their children." 
No action was taken by the administration until November 1919, when a 
special tax was approved by the voters. Approval of the tax, ostensibly "to 
provide a proper support for [police] and families" led instead to the con- 
frontation.]' At the core of the issue was the mayor's use of the $475,000 
collected through the new tax. Although the stated purpose of the funds 
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was to increase salaries, $215,000 was diverted for the city's "increased 
maintenance" and "capital outlay" expenditures. According to police and 
fire department spokesmen, the administration had reneged on the agree- 
ment it had made with the men before the election that personnel in both 
departments would receive a fifty per cent increase in their salaries. Amer- 
man denied that an agreement was ever made. It was never intended that 
the whole $475,000 should be distributed among police and firemen, he in- 
sisted. What transpired at the meeting between the mayor and the salary 
committee representing the police is uncertain, Public wording of the 
proposition, however, stated only that their income would be increased to 
such an extent as the "revenue will permit." 
According to Amerman, policemen received a twenty-one to twenty- 
six per cent increase, depending on the years of service-and this was more 
than other city employees had received. The salary for a uniformed officer 
under the revised scale ranged from $97.50 to $1 12.50 per month. Detec- 
tives were an exception; they received only a sixteen per cent increase.18 
Disappointed and frustrated by the administration's position, police 
and firemen met in a mass meeting on January 15, 1919, and unanimously 
adopted a resolution, prepared by the group's attorney, John H. Crooker, 
calling for the enactment of an ordinance to provide a minimum wage of 
$125 a month for all police and fire personnel. The proposed ordinance set 
no maximum limit on the pay scale and provided that the increase should 
be financed by the city's general funds. Other city employees were not 
mentioned in the petition, and an earlier petition sponsored by Houston's 
high school teachers was withdrawn.19 If the city administration refused to 
approve such an ordinance, the men declared themselves in favor of pre- 
senting the ordinance to the voters in the form of a referendum.20 
The administration rejected the demand, and police and firemen began 
to collect the 1600 signatures required for a referendum. A bitter feud en- 
sued between the two departments and the city. Amerman, with the sup- 
port of the Houston Chronicle and Houston Press, charged that the con- 
frontation was inspired by Crooker, who hoped to advance his own political 
ambitions by discrediting the administration and creating dissent while "the 
whole world is sitting on a volcano." Scare tactics, engendered by the 
hysterical fear of Bolshevism then sweeping the nation, attempted to associ- 
ate the police and firemen with leftist radicals. In a headline article, the 
Chronicle proclaimed, "Danger.. . Houston is threatened!" "Under the 
guise of initiative and referendum," the article continued, "IWWism has 
been started. The overthrow of orderly government is put under the plea of 
'more pay' for two classes of city employes.. . . If we are to have a Soviet 
government, why not do it right?" the newspaper asked.21 
Direct pressure was also applied on police and firemen. Police officers 
complained to newspaper reporters that Chief of Police Searcy Baker 
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warned members of the department that their jobs were being jeopardized 
by their participation in the referendum movement and that civil service 
rules could be used to dismiss them for any infraction of the regulations. 
Police officers were accused of being Bolsheviks, while firemen, because of 
their union affiliations, were considered IWW followers. Rumors were 
begun by the administration that even if the voters approved the ordinance, 
the city council, rather than increase salaries, might decide to reduce the 
police force by nearly one-third. Firemen, on the other hand, were 
threatened with dismissal if they either discussed the referendum or signed 
one of the circulating petitions. Fire Department Lieutenant R.A. Rose, 
one of the ordinance's most vocal supporters, resigned his position and ac- 
tively worked for the referendum, rather than submit to the threats.22 
Fear of dismissal forced some officers and firemen to disavow any 
dissatisfaction with their salaries and any support of the referendum, but a 
sufficient number of supporters in both departments maintained the 
momentum of the protest.23 By January 25 the referendum movement ap- 
peared to have gained enough public support to cause concern in the ad- 
ministration that the necessary number of signatures would be secured. Re- 
sponding to the apparent popular support given the movement, Com- 
missioner Matthew Drennan spoke out for the ordinance. On February 7 
success seemed assured when petitions with more than 2,000 signatures 
were filed in the Office of the City Clerk for verification in time for the 
March 4 election. To the disappointment of supporters of the ordinance, 
however, checkers in the City Clerk's office disqualified 898 of the names 
for reasons ranging from duplicate signatures to failure to pay the poll tax. 
On February 12 the city council officially rejected the petition for lack of the 
required number of certified signatures.24 
The disqualification was a bitter experience. Supporters of the ordi- 
nance accused officials in the City Clerk's office of being overly zealous in 
invalidating the signatures, but no effort was made to contest the results or 
revive the referendum movement. Despite the failure of the police to 
achieve their objective, the referendum controversy marked the first at- 
tempt by police and firemen in Houston to cooperate in a common effort to 
improve conditions in their respective departments. No similar effort of 
cooperation between the two departments was repeated until 1946, when 
police and firemen returned to the city council with demands for increased 
salaries. 
Prior to 1920 indications were that labor affiliation or an aggressive 
policy of petitioning and referendum might be the means of improving the 
occupational status of police service. But continued police activism after 
1920 was determined by external forces as well as the department's imma- 
turity. Coinciding with the referendum contest, a series of court decisions 
clarified the role of the police and their relationships with the community, 
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the municipal authorities, and organized labor. The concept of police work 
as it was forged by the courts had nationwide implications for the direction 
the growth of police professionalism would take. 
Sympathy toward strikers and demonstrations of dissatisfaction with 
the status of their occupation was not peculiar to Houston police officers. 
The issues of inadequate salaries, job insecurity, salary loss through cutback 
or injury, and a seventy-two-hour work week were the constant grievances 
of police officers in most municipal departments. Boston patrolmen, for 
example, worked from seventy-three to ninety-eight hours a week and re- 
ceived during the first year of service $2  1.09 a week, which increased to 
$30.68 a week after six years? 
The common bond between laborer and police officer was indicated 
nationally by the efforts of policemen from 1897 to 1920 to obtain union 
affiliation. Organized labor, however, did not at first welcome police unioni- 
zation, In 1897 the American Federation of Labor rejected the petition for 
membership by a group of Cleveland police officers because police depart- 
ments, like state militia, were considered outside the province of trade 
unions. Like the militia, the police were viewed as defenders of manage- 
ment, hostile to the working man. At the Convention of 1919 the Federa- 
tion reversed its official position, however, after labor officials recognized 
the widespread dissatisfaction among policemen and their potential value to 
labor's cause if organized. Within a short time police unions in thirty-seven 
cities claimed affiliation with the Federation despite the vigorous opposition 
of the affected municipalities.26 In June 1919 the issue of police unioniza- 
tion gained historic prominence when the Federation granted a petition 
from the Boston Police Department to organize a union. This action, in 
violation of Police Commissioner Edwin U. Curtis's prohibition against the 
formation of a police union, precipitated the Boston Police strike of August 
1919. The strike, which necessitated the use of the militia to maintain or- 
der, was broken by filling the 1,500 positions vacated by the strikers with 
nearly 1,000 World War I veterans.*' 
The Boston police strike had important ramifications for the pro- 
fessional development of police service in Houston and throughout the 
country. Coinciding with the rising fear of Bolshevism and radicalism, the 
strike engendered in the public a fear that unionization of the police posed a 
threat to national stability. Pronouncements by public officials supporting 
such a view intensified the anxiety and served to discredit proponents of 
police unions. More significantly, events in Boston set a precedent for view- 
ing police service as unique and outside the area of unionization and collec- 
tive bargaining enjoyed by other public employees and workers in private 
industry.28 When police officers were prevented from organizing to pro- 
mote their own welfare, they lost their only effective means to achieve 
redress of their grievances, and the municipalities gained complete control 
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over the direction of police work and the status of policemen. 
The uniqueness attributed to police service as an occupation and its 
subsequent exclusion from organized labor was given judicial sanction as 
early as 1903 in the Raycrofi v. Harrison decision of the Appellate Court of 
Illinois. The case involved the validity of an order issued by the Superin- 
tendent of the Chicago Police Department that no police officer could claim 
membership in any group except the Policemen's Benevolent Association. 
Although the court declined to pass judgment upon the question, it did 
note the distinctive character of policemen, declaring that "The police force 
. . . is a quasi-military organization. No one is compelled to belong to it,  but 
whosoever voluntarily engages in such service necessarily limits the right of 
action which, as a mere private citizen, and in no sense a public official, he 
would have."*9 
The most frequently quoted description of the status of police officers 
as distinct from that of other public employees was detailed by Judge 
Murray F. Tuley of the Circuit Court of Cook County in 1904, in the 
O'Regan v. City of Chicago decision: 
A police force IS peculrar, rlrr ~ e t r e 1 1 ~  . . . In 11s relation to the city govern- 
ment. It IS pract~cally an organ~zed force resembling In many respects a military 
force, organized under the laws of the United Stares and equally as Important as 
to the functions i t  is requ~red to perform 
I t  IS not an ordlnary branch of the executive government l~ke  the mayor's 
office, even, your water department, [he comp~roller's depar~ment, the health 
depar~ment even, bur, as I say I I  IS pecul~ar to Itself, and to look at I T  In the same 
I~ght that other branches of the executive department are regarded would be a 
m~srake In a judicial dec~ston It IS a department whlch requires thal the members 
of ~t shall surrender their lndlv~dual oplnion and power to act, and subm~t  o that 
of the controlling head just as much as the common sold~er must surrender his 
own opinlon and power of action to that of his commanding oficer.. . . Such 
d~scipline must be enforced.. . . 3 0  
The unique status of police service as defined in the Harrison and 
O'Regan decisions was later applied to cases involving police affiliations 
with unions or any organization deemed potentially threatening to munici- 
pal authorities. In one landmark case, the Lansing, Michigan, City Police 
and Fire Commission sought to control the membership of the depart- 
ment's chapter of the Fraternal Order of Policemen by using the threat of 
dismissal. Members of the Order appealed to the courts. The Michigan 
Supreme Court, quoting from a 1935 Virginia decision involving the right 
of firemen to become charter members of the International Association of 
Firefighters, reaffirmed the earlier cases by deciding that: 
Police and fire departments are In a class apart Both are at times charged with the 
preservauon of publ~c order, and for manlfold reasons they owe to the publ~c 
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their undlvlded allegiance The power in the city of complete control 1s Impera- 
uvely necessary ~f dlscipl~ne IS to be mn~ntarned 31 
Differentiation between the police service and other public employees 
with regard to the right to organize attained its legal conclusion in the 
McLeod case.32 The case arose from the action taken in June 1944 by 
Jackson, Mississippi, city officials against members of the police depart- 
ment. When notified by the Chief of Police that members of the police 
department had decided to organize into a union affiliated with the 
American Federation of Labor, Mayor Walter A. Scott, supported by the 
city commission, issued an order that all the involved police officers should 
abandon their plans within forty-eight hours or face dismissal. Thirty-four 
of the men refused to obey the order. They were immediately dismissed 
and other men were hired to fill their places. The dismissals were sanc- 
tioned by the municipal Civil Service Commission on the grounds that the 
officers were insubordinate and engaging in activities tending to jeopardize 
the public service. The police officers then appealed to the Circuit Court, 
which upheld the action of the Civil Service Commission. 
In January 1946 the case reached the Mississippi State Supreme Court. 
The Court drew a sharp distinction between labor unions in private em- 
ployment and those in city service, noting that union affiliation fostered 
divided Ioyalty on the police force and was cause enough to warrant the 
dismissals. 
It will thus be seen that police officers whose duty to the public requires them to 
keep the peace, acttng always in so d o ~ n g  in the interest of the public, who [sic] 
are members of the labor unfon owe an allegiance thereto which requlres them at 
all times to support and promote rhe union's objectives and the labor movement 
in general . . . The public Interest requlres the und~v~ded  loyalty of pol~ce officers 
to the public service and we were told long ago by One whose judgment was in- 
fallible that 'no man can serve two masters.. . .'33 
The McLeod decision established in legal terms the concept expressed 
by President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 that the policeman has "the obliga- 
tion of a soldier. He is a public servant, not a private employee, and the 
whole honor of the community is in his hands. He has no right to prefer 
any private advantage to the public safety."34 
In Texas, firemen rather than policemen first aroused the ire of muni- 
cipal authorities. More than thirty nationwide lockouts, mass resignations, 
and strikes during 1918 and 1919 by chapters of the International Associa- 
tion of Fire Fighters demonstrated to Texas officials the dangers inherent in 
the organization of public service employees.35 Municipal officials were 
quick to act against the unionization efforts of firemen. Although a right-to- 
organize statute had existed in Texas since 1899, the law was circumvented 
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by the courts. Texas jurists found that the law prohibited legislation that 
made union membership illegal, but did not regulate the attitude of the em- 
ployer toward the unionization of his employees. A fine distinction was 
made between a law prohibiting labor unions and the "legitimate" demand 
by an employer that his employees not join a labor organization. Conse- 
quently, in ~ a n u a r ~  1918 the mayor and city commissioners of Dallas dis- 
missed a number of firemen for insubordination when they refused to 
terminate their association with a local union affiliated with the A.F.L. 
In June 1920 the Court of Civil Appeals in McNatt v. Lawthersup- 
ported the dismissals on the grounds that Dallas authorities had not 
violated the 1899 statute, since they had enacted no ordinance forbidding 
the creation of a union, but rather had only required that city employees 
not become members. The court held such requirements to be within the 
prerogative of the city.36 A similar decision was delivered in a case involv- 
ing San Antonio firefighters. The effect of the Dallas and San Antonio 
decisions rendered the right-to-organize statute ineffectual and stifled the 
growth of public employee unions wherever municipal authorities opposed 
them. Dallas and San Antonio firemen, for example, were forbidden to 
organize until 1956, when the 1920 decision was finaIly overturned. The 
McNatt decision was not challenged before 1957 despite the passage in 
1947 of a legislative act safeguarding the right of public employees to 
belong to labor organizations, if not the right to bargain collectively.37 
Although Houston firemen formed a union in 1902 and organized a 
local chapter of the International Association of Fire Fighters in August 
1919, the city's police failed to organize despite their unsatisfactory situa- 
tion.38 They accepted, with the conservative philosophy characteristic of 
police officers, the unique nature of police service as expounded in the 
decisions of the courts. Although sympathy for the worker and at times 
collaboration with strikers occurred, the taint of radicalism associated with 
unions and strikes contradicted the function of the police as conservators of 
stability. As viewed by police officers, law enforcement was indeed a unique 
calling demanding loyaIty and faithfulness to duty. The role of policemen 
was a self-sacrificing one in which they were "compelled by the nature of 
their duties to forego certain personal privileges enjoyed by workers in 
private industry. One of these is union membership."39 At times the sensi- 
tivity of police officers to charges of police unionism has been used to their 
disadvantage. During 1945 and 1946 opponents of the Houston Police Of- 
ficers Association, in an effort to deter officers from joining the Associa- 
tion, accused members of the fledgling group of attempting to unionize the 
department. Membership in the Association was equated with radicalism, 
even though the use of strikes had never been advocated as a means of 
exerting ideological pressure.40 
Firemen, because of the different nature of their service, are not simi- 
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larly restricted by role self-conceptions in their ambition to unionize. The 
service they perform is a tangible one-to save lives and property-and in- 
volves an inanimate enemy. Policemen, however, perceive themselves as 
providing intangible as well as tangible service, as the last line of defense 
against those elements of society that threaten the institutions and life of 
the community. Burdened by a self-imposed sense of mission and obligated 
by community expectation, policemen have been reluctant to align them- 
selves with organized labor or to support labor legislation that would in their 
view compromise their image. 
Because of these differences in the conceptualization of their roles, 
police and firemen have at times clashed over methods of advancing their 
interests cooperatively. As a recent example, Houston police officers op- 
posed efforts by the State Association of Fire Fighters to enact the "Fire 
and Police Employee Relations Act" in the 63rd Legislarure.41 The act, 
which provided for the right of collective bargaining for police and firemen, 
once approved in a local option election, was opposed by police lobbyists on 
the ground that it would hinder rather than assist policemen in dealing with 
municipal authorities. Collective bargaining, they feared, would entangle 
the police department in labor disputes and thereby alienate those officials 
who have in the past supported police pay raises and other legislation bene- 
ficial to the department.42 
Conservative police officers have been placed in a tenuous position by 
their need to maintain a delicate balance between conservative and liberal 
legislators. On one hand, police lobbyists, like the labor-oriented fire 
fighters, have courted the support of liberals for legislation providing for job 
benefits and reform.43 In 1947, for example, the police courted the liberals 
for support of a state civil service bill that provided the keystone of police 
reform. Likewise police lobbyists have sought the support of liberal legisla- 
tors for laws establishing survivors' insurance for law enforcement officers 
killed in the line of duty, educational fee exemptions for children of dis- 
abled policemen and firemen, and the Law Enforcement Officer Standards 
and Education Commission, and for similar legislation.44 
On the other hand, the police have sought the support of conservatives 
for the enactment of stringent law enforcement Legislation providing for the 
death penalty, the admission in court of oral confessions, and stronger con- 
spiracy laws.45 
The bond between police officer and laborer, initially weakened by a 
conservative view of society, was further weakened by the movement 
toward professionalism. The gradual transition in the status of municipal 
police officers from that of an unskilled laborer in the early twentieth cen- 
tury to that of a quasi-professional in the post-World War I1 period vested 
them with a newly discovered elitism. Police literature in the late 1940s 
began to emphasize professional growth, thereby reflecting a shift in status. 
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A concomitant upward trend in salaries placed the police service in compe- 
tition with private industry, and the enactment of effective civil service laws 
provided job security and stability. More careful screening of applicants, a 
demanding training program, and an increased emphasis on education have 
attracted men to the police ranks who are less sympathetic to labor unions 
than were policemen of earlier decades.46 
Eschewing organized labor, the police turned to alternat~ve public em- 
ployee associations to represent their interests. The form of the organiza- 
tions and the dates of their formation depended upon local conditions. In 
New York City the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association was organized in 
1894 to meet the need for a burial insurance and survivors' fund. Once 
organized, however, the Association became a political pressure group cam- 
paigning for increased salaries and improved working conditions. Similarly, 
Los Angeles police officers organized a Police Relief Association in 1919 in 
response to an immediate need for financial assistance to officers and their 
survivors. In 1923, the Los Angeles Fire and Protective League was ini- 
tially formed to establish a combined pension system for both departments, 
but it became a pressure group seeking salary increases and security from 
political patronage.47 Police organizations in most departments arose in 
response to specific (generally economic) needs, and then directed their 
attention to other job-related issues. Although unable to participate in 
direct employee-management negotiations, the organizations through their 
appeals to the public and informal lobbying activities assumed a quasi- 
labor-union status. 
In Houston, police organization arose more from resentment of 
political patronage than from unresolved labor-related issues such as salaries 
and pensions. Police service was dominated by politics, making employ- 
ment in the department dependent upon affiliation with the political faction 
in office. Strikebreakers were analogous to the political favorites who fre- 
quently replaced police officers whenever there was a change in city ad- 
ministrations. Policemen knew that they were at the mercy of political 
bosses in much the same way that laborers were vulnerable to the manipu- 
lation of management.40 Sympathy for the striker, as exhibited during the 
streetcar strikes of 1898 and 1904, and later, in a more subdued manner, 
during the iongshoremenYs trike of 1935, related in part to the insecurity 
of their own occupational status.@ 
The Association, by partially fulfilling the role of a labor union, gave 
the police an alternative to affiliation with organized labor. Enactment of a 
state civil service law in 1947 shielded the police from city management, 
which municipal civil service had failed to do. With police officers protected 
from the capricious actions of city officials and the Association providing the 
means of expression and the possibility of professional status, the sense of 
common experience once shared by public servant and private employee 
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was eliminated.50 
Formation of a police association in Houston was delayed until more 
than two decades after the referendum controversy of 1920. The confronta- 
tion had been premature. Self-confidence, the development of a mentality 
professionalIy oriented toward police work and, more importantly, the 
leadership required for organization were long lacking. Moreover, unlike 
the city's fire fighters, who through their many years of experience with 
labor organizations were able to rally support for their cause, the police 
could expect no support except the sympathy of the public. Even this was 
generally negated by ineffective and frequently irresponsible police 
behavior, which was encouraged by a municipal civil service system ren- 
dered useless by irresponsible city management. 
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